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HUSSERL AND REINACH, THE IDEA OF PROMISE  
 
Nathalie Barbosa de La CadenaФ 
 
ABSTRACT: In this paper, I discuss the possibility of reading the description of promise 
presented by Reinach in The A priori Foundations of the Civil Law under the light of 
Husserl’s Ideas I. In order to present my argument, first, I briefly present the 
phenomenological method proposed by Husserl in Ideas I highlighting eidetic reduction. 
Second, I present the Reinachian description of social acts emphasizing the act of 
promising. Third, and finally, I try to demonstrate that the Reinachian description of the 
social act of promising is the description of a universal and necessary relation, a synthet ic 
and a priori statement and corresponds to the idea of promise.  
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Phenomenology is a contemporary philosophical tradition launched by 
Edmund Husserl with the publication of Logical Investigations in 1900/01. Logical 
Investigations had a huge impact on a group of scholars that started a realistic 
phenomenological tradition, namely Johannes Daubert, Alexander Pfänder, Adolf 
Reinach, Max Scheler, Edith Stein and Roman Ingarden, among others. The first one to 
apply phenomenological thought to the law was Adolf Reinach. In 1913, the young 
philosopher presented his monograph on The A priori Foundations of the Civil Law. In 
the same year, Husserl published Ideas I. Those students considered it an idealistic turn 
of his thinking, remaining faithful to Logical Investigations. Nevertheless, Reinach was 
still a beloved student of Husserl and probably would have become his heir if he had not 
died in 1917 during the First World War.  
In this paper, I would like to argue for considering that Husserl has a 
very clear purpose with the phenomenological method presented in Ideas I, that is to say, 
to reach and describe the idea embodied in an intentional object. Reinach with his 
analyses of the promise presented in The A priori Foundations of the Civil Law fulfi ls 
exactly this purpose. Husserl starts with the phenomenon, reflects on it, making it an 
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object for a transcendental consciousness, a lived event. He has already intuited the eidos, 
but to describe it, first he parenthesizes the lived event and applies the phenomenologica l 
method with the clear objective of overcoming the universal eidos embodied in its 
particular eidos. Reinach also starts with a reflection over a phenomenon – the promise, 
also suspends judgment looking at the thing as such. He is in search of the eidos, but 
without the phenomenological method, all he has is intuition and through it manages to 
overcome and describe its eidos.  
I believe that Reinach intended only to describe the essence of a legal 
promise and to make it the prime example of an a priori theory of law. However, it 
accomplishes more than this. In Husserlian language, Reinach describes not only the 
particular eidos of a legal promise, the universality of the noemata, but he reaches the 
very ideia of promise, the universality of the noema. He describes the ideia of promise, 
any promise, juridical, political, religious, familiar, and so on.  
In order to present my argument, first, I will briefly expose the 
phenomenological method as proposed by Husserl in Ideas I emphasizing the trajectory 
from the phenomenon to the noema. Then, I will present Reinach’s description of promise 
in the context of social acts. Finally, I will conclude that Reinachian description of the 
essence of promise fulfils the Husserlian concept of noematic core. 
 
1. Husserl, to the idea 
The phenomenological method was proposed in Ideas I (HUA 3/1, 93 
et seq) and its main goal is to reach the universal and necessary, the idea. On this path, 
Husserl describes many steps, relations and moments, but I will highlight only the 
following three: epoché, transcendental reduction and eidetic reduction. The first moment 
is epoché, and the other two are more concurrent ones. Epoché is described in Ideas I as 
a phenomenological attitude of the subject before the object, which is completely different 
from natural attitude. Natural attitude is not appropriate behaviour in pursuit of 
knowledge since it is full of expectations and prejudices. It is to judge or to take a decision 
about an object, situation or person without much reflection, without comprehending it. 
It might be useful to deal with everyday life, but not to comprehend an object. The epoché 
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is the attempt to convert natural attitude into parenthesized judgment, that is to say, to 
suspend judgment universally with the objective of being perfectly free of convictions. In 
other words, the positing is put out of action, excluded or parenthesized. Therefore, the 
knowing subject is protected from the influence of suppositions, expectations or 
preconceptions, including science-related propositions. The subject looks to the object as 
it appears, as it shows itself. The epoché opens a new domain of study, by the 
parenthesizing method it is possible to evidence the intentional object and its relations as 
they are shown, as part of a lived event in transcendental consciousness, to observe its 
main characteristics without veiling it with our expectations or preconceptions, and to 
distinguish the object itself from what we would like it to be. In doing so, we also 
distinguish the observer from the object since it constantly frustrates our expectations, not 
working as we would like. However, at this point, it is not yet possible to describe the 
characteristics of the intentional object. At this point, all we have is eidetic intuition, a 
non-reflecting intuition.  
Transcendental reduction leads the subject from the intentional object 
to the relation between the subject and the object in the way it is given. It allows the 
subject to realize the difference between the intentional object and the subject that is 
intending it. It is when the subject realizes that she is the being conducting the whole 
process; she is the being trying to comprehend the world we live in; her consciousness is 
the place where the world and its objects are constituted, and the agent that makes them 
evident. In this sense, Zahavi (2008) defines Husserl as a transcendental idealist: the 
evidence of the external world not only takes place in consciousness but the whole process  
of knowledge of the external world is led by consciousness.  
Eidetic reduction is based on eidetic intuition. Eidetic intuition takes 
place when a subject, before an object, captures immediately its essence. This intuition is 
direct as Husserl does not admit any kind of representationalism (Zahavi, 2008). In 
Husserl’s words,  
“[i]n immediately intuitive acts we intuit an ‘it self;’ on their 
apprehendings no mediate apprehendings are built up at higher level; 
thus there is no consciousness of anything for which the intuited might 
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function as a ‘sign’ or ‘picture’. And just on that account it is said to be 
immediately intuited as ‘it self’”. (HUA 3/1, p. 79)  
The intuition of something individual can be transmuted into ideation, 
or eidetic seeing. This is possible because, while the natural sciences apprehend the 
objects in their physical, space-temporal and contingent presentiveness, having a one-
sided intuition or an inadequate intuition, phenomenology focus on the essence, looks for 
a more adequate intuition, one in a multiplicity and continuous flow of intuitions, tries to 
capture what remains in a lived event1, the eidetic necessity. So the eidos intuited in the 
lived event becomes a new object of cognition, the object of an eidetic science, 
phenomenology. For example, from the living event of holding a ball of wax, she can 
intuit its singular size, weight, color, shape, smell and texture, and, at the same time, on 
the same living experience, she can intuit its material characteristic and that it implies a 
few necessities, such as, having extension and shape, and being filled with color. These 
are two different types of intuition given at the same time, through the same lived event, 
an empirical intuition and an eidetic intuition. Thus, “Everything belonging to the essence 
of the individuum another individuum can have too; and the highest eidetic universalities 
of the sort just indicated in our examples delimit “regions”, or “categories” of 
individua.” (HUA 3/1, 9) On the other hand, each ontological region determines what 
applies “a priori” and “synthetically” to an object within the extension of the region 
(HUA 3/1, 31).  
The phenomenological comprehension of the lived event allows the 
subject to realize that there are two inseparable dimensions, subjective and objective. The 
former consists of consciousness acts, acts performed by the subject of knowledge, such 
as thinking, remembering, judging, etc., which Husserl calls ‘noesis’. The latter 
                                                                 
1  TRANSLATION NOTE: In Ideas I, F. Kersten translates ‘die Erlebnisse’ to ‘mental processes’. With 
much respect, I do not think it is the best translation. Das Erlebnis is a remarkable event that someone has 
experienced, or has lived. It refers to the whole experience of living a specific event. When you translate to 
‘mental processes’, it seems that the emphasis is on the consciousness acts (noese), but ‘das Erlebnis’ is not 
only about them, it is also about the content of these acts (noema), and more, is about the eidetic re lation  
between them (the noetic-noematic relation). Therefore, I think the Brazilian-Portuguese translation is 
better; it is translated to ‘lived’ (vivido) to indicate an event experienced or lived, in short, a ‘lived event’ 
that now is under focus. 
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comprises the contents of those acts, the objects of consciousness acts, ‘what’ you think, 
‘what’ you remember, ‘what’ you judge, etc. Husserl calls this ‘noema’. Phenomeno logy 
aims to describe everything that it is necessary about a lived event in its noetic and 
noematic dimensions, and in its noetic-noematic relation.   
At first sight, there is the non-reflecting lived event; then there is a 
modification in consciousness, one becomes aware of the lived event and starts to reflect 
on it; lived event becomes, then, a reflected lived event. There are various reflection acts 
that cross a lived event, the immanent eidetic seizing, the immanent experiencing, the 
remembrance of something that has been perceived, or the expectation of something that 
will become perceived. Husserl explains:  
The ray of attention presents itself as emanating from the pure Ego and 
terminating in that which is objective, as directed to it or being diverted 
from it. The ray does not become detached from the Ego; on the 
contrary, it is itself an Ego-ray, and remains an Ego-ray. The “Object” 
is struck; it is the target, it is put into a relation to the Ego (and by the 
Ego itself) but is not “subjective”. (HUA 3/1, 192). 
Therefore, all intentionally lived events are composed of acts of 
consciousness that reach intentional objects, namely, their objective sense (HUA 3/1, 
185-190). Besides, there are necessary relations between noeses and noemas, that is to 
say, certain consciousness acts have specific intentional objects, or certain objects can 
only be intended by specific consciousness acts.  Acts of perceiving and evaluating have 
noemas with two levels of essentiality, a pure one and a particular one, the pure eidos 
(species) and its particularization (noemata). Acts of judging and wishing have no pure 
eidos, there is only the judged or willed as such (HUA 3/1, 197-206). For example, I am 
looking forward to a chocolate cake. I wish to eat a chocolate cake; my desire is a 
particular act. However, I can “struck” this intentional object with another act, an 
evaluation act. I would have to evaluate this specific lived event of ‘looking forward to 
eating a chocolate cake’, and I would have to evaluate the conflicting values considering 
an objective hierarchy of values (HUA 3/1, 241-245), in this case, health and pleasure.  
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There is a difference between particular moments and pure eidetic 
moments. Husserl calls these particular moments real moments composed of hylletic and 
noetic moments of the lived event. For example, when I perceive the color of a tree trunk, 
I perceive a specific color of a specific object. When I parenthesize it, I apprehend the 
color itself, on the same continuous unity, the noemata unity, that reveals the eidos post 
reduction.  Describing in more detail, eidetic reduction commences when, after assuming 
the phenomenological attitude – epoché, the subject varies the characteristics of an 
intentional object until she reaches a ‘core’ of characteristics that cannot vary anymore. 
The subject has to mentally ask if each of the characteristics is necessary. If the 
characteristic is taken away and the object becomes something else, then it is a necessary 
characteristic (HUA 3/1, 184). This core of characteristics is the essence of the intentiona l 
object. It is important to highlight that, in the first moment, the essence is intuited but it 
is not yet possible to describe it. The subject is an observer and it is important that she 
assumes this attitude so her expectations do not veil her observation. It is only in the 
second moment that the subject will be able to describe the essence of the intentiona l 
object. At this point, the subject assumes an active attitude varying the characteristics of 
the intentional object. The object is passive; it is manifested, originally given. It is up to 
the subject to assume then an active attitude, to comprehend it with all its complexity, to 
evidence which are its essential and accidental characteristics, to constitute the object by 
varying its characteristics. At this moment, the subject has reached the eidos of the 
noemata. However, she still has to move to another level of essentiality, the eidos of the 
noema. In other words, this is the description of essential contents of individual noemata, 
and phenomenology aims to describe its laws of constitution.  
Thus, the phenomenological reduction will make reaching the non-real 
moments, the ideal moments or the noematic moments possible. In other words, the real 
unity of the lived event is composed of noeses, that is to say, acts of consciousness, and 
hyletic data, sensuous contents that present the object. This unity reveals the individua l 
as the same, material, concrete, which allows me to say “I see the same tree”. The ideal 
unity is the noema which reveals the post-reduction essence (HUA 3/1, 202-205). In the 
example of the tree, there is the color of the tree trunk, the feeling of the color, the unity 
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of the real lived event, the unity that reveals the individual as the same, the unity of the 
hyletic and of the noese, and there is the same identical color, immutable, the color in the 
continuous unity of a perceptive consciousness, the unity of the noema. 
Husserl’s main interest in proposing the phenomenological method was 
to describe the noematic core, the identical, the determinable X, the eidos, or the ideia. In 
other words, lived events give occasion to, through phenomenological reduction, reach 
the pure eidetic sphere where the noematic core is. But there is a question: how to pass 
from the real composition of the lived event to the ideal one? 
The intentional object as such appears as support to all noematic 
characters. Corresponding to noematic characters, also called modes of being, there are 
noetic characters (HUA 3/1, 214-216), for example, certainty corresponds to perceptual 
belief, possible to assumption, plausible to conjecture, problematic to questioning, 
doubtful to doubt, denial to rejection, affirmation to assent (HUA 3/1, 214-222). Aside 
from the modifications related to the sphere of belief, there is a consciousness mode 
entirely particular, neutrality (HUA 3/1, 222-228). Neutrality is a modification in the 
sphere of belief that does not operate, simply parenthesizes, leaves the character of 
position in suspense.  
Neutrality and positing are opposing attitudes, yet complementa ry 
(HUA 3/1, 223-224). They are opposing attitudes because positing is positional, evaluates 
with reason, and may be either correct or incorrect; neutrality or suspension is not 
positional, cannot be evaluated with reason, and cannot be either correct or incorrect. 
They are complementary because all lived events ideally correspond to a neutraliza t ion 
mode. Hence, in the essence of all lived events a set of potential positions of being is 
outlined beforehand (HUA 3/1, 228-236).  
Following the examples of noeses of perception, Husserl turns his 
attention to noeses of feeling, of desiring, of willing (HUA 3/1, 238-245). Through these 
examples, Husserl passes from particular to universal, from hyletic and noetic to 
noematic. To these new noetic moments there is a corresponding new dimension of sense, 
new noematic moments: values. Values are not determining parts of things; things have 
no value, they support value (HUA 3/1, 239-240). That is to say, in the affective 
  
Número XX – Volume II – dezembro de 2017 
eticaefilosofia.ufjf.emnuvens.com.br 
ISSN: 1414-3917 
e-ISSN: 2448-2137 
 
 
 
92 
 
consciousness, the higher level noema - value - is a core of sense surrounded by new 
posited characters. Thus, apprehensions of value relate to apprehensions of things in the 
same way that the new noematic characterizations (beauty and ugliness, goodness and 
badness) relate to modes of belief.  
Through analyses of acts of will in general it is possible to see that under 
these positional characters lies an archontic positing that unifies in itself and governs all 
others, the supreme unity of species, the universality of essence (HUA3/1, 241-245). And 
despite the fact that here we are dealing with acts of will, because it is possible to 
“translate” an affective thesis into a doxic thesis, it is possible to reach and describe its 
noema (HUA 3/1, 243-244). Thus the analogy between universal logic, universal theory 
of value, and ethics. These lead to the constitution of universal formal parallels: formal 
logic, formal axiology, and theory of practice. This is how it is possible to reach the realm 
of essences from the phenomenon; it is an eidetic science or ontology. 
 
2. Reinach on promise  
As mentioned, after the publication of Ideas I, Reinach remained 
faithful to Logical Investigations and did not follow Husserl’s steps. Reinach “understood 
phenomenology as a philosophical realism, and while Husserl was developing his 
transcendental phenomenology” (Crosby, 1983-A). James DuBois stresses: “[i]n 
Reinach’s entire collected works, the words ‘epoché’ and ‘noema’ appear nowhere. He 
belonged to the early group of phenomenologists who believed that phenomenology was 
a distinctive and promising approach to philosophy, but who felt no sympathy for 
idealism.” (2002, p. 329) 
Therefore, I fully accept that Reinach did not at all intend to attain the 
idea of promise. However, I believe that is what he did in analyzing it, all by intuit ion, 
without applying the phenomenological method. His aim was to describe the being of 
social acts, not what ought to be. He was not focused on morals or values (De Vecchi, p. 
279 et seq.), but on the universal and necessary relations that make social acts possible, 
necessary conditions that make social acts intelligible.  
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In The A priori Foundations of the Civil Law, Reinach (1983, p. 9) 
presents a new category of objects that was not considered by Husserl in Logical 
Investigations (HUA 19). They are neither physical nor psychical; they could be ideal, a 
value, for instance, but one of the characteristics of ideal objects is timelessness, and the 
objects in question are temporal objects. Reinach (1983, p. 6) defines them as temporal 
objects of a special kind. The example given is the promise. To study this kind of object, 
Reinach analyses different acts performed by beings and comes up with the idea of ‘social 
acts’.  
There are various kinds of acts, such as passive acts, e.g. listening, 
spontaneous acts, e.g. feeling joy, and active acts, e.g. making a decision. The difference 
between a spontaneous act and an active act is that in the former the subject is not the 
author of the act, it is an internal act but he does not control it. An example would be, for 
instance, when hearing a beautiful song; I cannot avoid the relief or joy that arises in me. 
In contrast, an active act comes from a resolution, it depends on a conscious decision of 
the subject; in Max Scheler’s (1960, p. 24) language, it is a free and motivated act, e.g. 
forgiving or commanding. In addition, there are acts that presuppose a second subject at 
whom the act of the first subject is aimed, e.g. envying.  
Among these acts, there are important differences. Some acts have to 
be manifested externally, e.g. crying or laughing. Some acts have to be manifested 
externally and must be perceived as such, e.g. commanding and begging. Commanding 
and begging are necessarily different, but both have to be perceived as such, especially 
when the sentence is the same, e.g. ‘Don’t’. If I say it to my daughter with a low tone of 
voice she will understand it as a command; if I say it, crying, to a thug, it will be a plea. 
Some acts have to be manifested externally, must be perceived as such and await 
feedback, e.g. proclaiming or asking a question. Asking is only complete if an answer is 
received; otherwise, the person who asked the question will be waiting for it indefinite ly. 
All acts that have to be manifested externally and presuppose a second subject at whom 
the act of the first subject is aimed are ‘social acts’. The most significant example of a 
social act given by Reinach is promising.  
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Promise has a specific inner structure which can be presented like this: 
“one who makes a promise incurs an obligation; one who receives a promise bears a 
claim; such claims are extinguished when the promise is fulfilled, or in the case that the 
recipient of the promise waives his claim; and so forth.” (Dubois, 1995, p. 135) In other 
words, promise gives rise to claims and obligations. Claims and obligations also have 
their own characteristics, such as: claim and obligation necessarily involve a bearer and 
a content, every obligation refers to a future action of its bearer, and there is a peculiar 
kind of correlativity between them (Reinach, 1983, p.12). 
The description of states of affairs that ground acts of promising is not 
only a description of a particular legal entity, and its predication does not refer to a 
specific species of promise – legal promises, but to any promise, it refers to the genus 
promise. It means that its “predication is valid for absolutely everything which is of this 
kind, and that it necessarily belongs to every such thing, and that it could not fail, not 
even once, to hold for any particular case.” (Reinach, 1973, p. 5) The description of 
promise essence is not only valid for legal promises; its essence is necessary and 
universal, an a priori statement valid for legal entities and for all other species of 
promises.  
What Reinach describes are not only objects of a priori theory of right. 
He recognizes necessary and universal states of affairs that ground any promise, 
obligation or claim. “That a claim lapses through being waived, is grounded in the essence 
of a claim as such and holds therefore necessarily and universally.” (Reinach, 1983, p.5) 
This characteristic does not apply only to legal promises, obligations or claims, but to all 
of them, promises, obligations or claims of any kind.   
In this sense, Reinach affirms “Let us recall the relation between 
promises on the one hand and claims and obligations on the other: this was bound to 
remain uncertain and doubtful as long as one retained the unclear concept of declaration 
of intention and failed to work one’s way to a clear conception of the nature of promising 
and of the social acts in general. Ultimate intuitions of essence, too, have to be worked 
out. And it is only purely phenomenological analysis which can give us that insight into 
essential relations which is evident and unburdened by any further doubt; this insight 
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cannot be replaced by appealing to that which makes these essential relations “possible 
at all”.” (Reinach, 1983, p.132) 
Reinach reaches this point assuming the phenomenological attitude, 
keeping his consciousness committed to the real in the way it is given, returning to the 
things themselves. From the phenomenon of legal promise, through eidetic intuition, he 
describes necessary relations that are essential to any species of promise. In other words, 
the phenomenon of legal promise gives him occasion to reach and describe the universa l 
and necessary relations of promise, its eidos.   
Therefore, I defend the proposition that in describing the structure and 
the characteristics of promise, Reinach reached the realm of essences, universal and 
necessary states of affairs that are ground to any act of promising, synthetic and a priori 
laws that refer to any individual entity under them. His intention was to present an 
ontology of civil law, but he achieved much more than this. Reinach described the idea 
of promise.  
 
3. The idea of promise  
To read the Reinachian description of promise under the light of 
Husserlian Ideas, it is important to highlight that Husserl proposes a distinction between 
the real unity of the lived event composed by noetic and hyletic elements, and the ideal 
unity of it composed by the noema, and this distinction cannot be found in Reinach.  
The main objective of the phenomenological method is to describe the 
eidos, the idea, or the noematic core of a lived event. In Husserl’s words, “the “matter”, 
which is, in the particular case, the “what” which receives the posited characteristic, the 
“quality”, corresponds to the “noematic core” (HUA 3/1, 268). In more detail, “We can 
say then: several act-noemata have here, throughout, different cores, yet in such a manner 
that, in spite of this, they are joined together to make a unity of identity, to make unity in 
which the “something,” the determinable which inheres in each core, is intended to as an 
identical “something”.” (HUA 3/1, 271). 
To explain it, Husserl makes a turn in his theory of sense [Sinn] and 
meaning [Bedeutung] from Logical Investigations (1900) to Volesungen über 
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Bedeutunglehre (1908) and Idea I (1913). In his words, “In the Logische Untersuchungen 
they [posited moments] were (under the title “quality”) taken into the concept of sense 
(of significational essense) and therefore in this unity the two concepts, “matter” (sense, 
in the present conception) and quality, were distinguished. But it seems more suitable to 
define the term “sense” as merely that “matter” and then to designate the unity of sense 
and posited characteristic as “positum”. [...] The concept of the positum is accordingly 
indeed extraordinarily and perhaps surprisingly broadened, but nevertheless within the 
bounds of an important essential unity. [...] these concepts designate an abstract stratum 
belonging to the full web of all noemata.” (HUA 3/1, 274) So now the full noematic core 
– idea – is clearly understood as the unity of sense in the mode belonging to its fullness 
(§132).   
The question is how to apply the phenomenological method of 
description of essences to Reinachian new objects, social acts? In The A priori 
Foundations of the Civil Law, Reinach presents a new kind of objects to be studied by 
phenomenology, social acts, and promise is a social act. To take promise as an intentiona l 
object and apply over it the phenomenological method to see if Reinach’s description of 
its essence can be understood as a noematic core, first it is important to highlight two 
distinctions. First, we are not investigating the content of the act of promising, that is, we 
are not investigating ‘what one promises’, the content of a promise cannot be confused 
with the act of promising. Second, we are not investigating the mental act, in Husserl’s 
language, we are not investigating the noese, the consciousness act. We are investiga t ing 
a state of affairs, a social act, the act of promising and all its necessary relations. This 
difference is also highlighted by Mulligan, in verbis: “Reinach at any rate saw very clearly 
that social acts are not any sort of description of or statement about mental acts.” 
(Mulligan, 1987, p.38)  
Having that said, we are investigating ‘the act of promising’, which is 
a species of social act, and, therefore, implies a certain state of affairs. We are in search 
of its noematic core. 
So, what is the noematic core of the act of promising? That is precisely 
what Reinach describes. Being a social act, promise has to be manifested externally, must 
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be perceived as such and await feedback, this is, promise has to be manifested externally 
and presupposes a second subject at whom the act of the first subject is aimed. That is the 
new region presented by Reinach, composed of objects that are neither physical nor 
psychical, and they are not ideal since they are temporal. Thus, social acts are temporal 
object of a special kind. They are actions placed under investigation, not consciousness 
acts, social acts; the intentional object is an action which implies several necessary 
relations. Among social acts, Reinach presents the description of promise. Being an 
action, its noematic core is not “matter” in the conventional way, its noematic core is its 
necessary relation. 
Keeping in mind that we are investigating a new species of object, 
social actions, to look for the noematic core of it is entirely different from looking for the 
noematic core of a real, ideal or formal object. In the acts of perceiving, evaluating, or 
operating, all consciousness acts, noeses, there is a clear intentional object, a concrete 
object, a value, or a number, hyletic elements that under the phenomenological method 
will lead to the noematic core. However, when the intentional object is a social action, 
promising, it is entirely different. The content of the act of promising does not matter, is 
not what is under investigation. It is the act of promising itself.  
In Kantian language, his description is a synthetic a priori statement 
about the social action to promise. That ‘whoever makes a promise incurs an obligat ion; 
one who receives a promise bears a claim’ is a synthetic statement because, as Kant [KrV, 
B7-B19] explains, the concept expressed by the predicate of the proposition is not 
contained in the concept expressed by its subject, and it is a priori because it is universa l 
and necessary. Husserl also uses this reasoning on his classical example of the color. The 
same way there is a necessary and universal relation between color and extension, and 
the concept of color does not contain the concept of extension, both being entirely 
different and yet correlated; there is a necessary and universal relation between promise, 
obligation and claim. Their concepts are not mutually contained, yet they are correlated. 
These are synthetical a priori statements about color (Husserl) and promise (Reinach). In 
this sense, we have the understanding of De Vecchi (2012, p. 39): “Reinach extends the 
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synthetic a priori defined by Edmund Husserl in Logical Research (1900/1901) to the 
sphere of social and juridical.”  
In Husserlian language, what Reinach describes is its noematic core. He 
is describing the nucleus of promising, its necessary inner structure, the idea of promise. 
‘Whoever makes a promise incurs an obligation; one who receives a promise bears a 
claim’ is the idea of promise, is what makes the act of promising intelligible. It is not 
valid only for legal promises, but for any promise in any sphere of human life – religious, 
moral, cultural, political and so on. Therefore, I believe that, in describing promise, 
Reinach has given one of the most significant examples of idea realizing the Husserl’s 
purpose in Ideias I.  
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